Policing Academics: The Arkhè of Transformation in Academic Ranking by John Welsh
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ycrh20
Critical Horizons
A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory
ISSN: 1440-9917 (Print) 1568-5160 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ycrh20
Policing Academics: The Arkhè of Transformation
in Academic Ranking
John Welsh
To cite this article: John Welsh (2018) Policing Academics: The Arkhè of Transformation in
Academic Ranking, Critical Horizons, 19:3, 246-263, DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2018.1485251
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2018.1485251
Published online: 02 Jul 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 9
View Crossmark data
Policing Academics: The Arkhè of Transformation in Academic
Ranking
John Welsh
Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
ABSTRACT
This article attempts a properly critical and political analysis of the
“police power” immanent to the form and logic of academic
rankings, and which is reproduced in the extant academic
literature generated around them. In contrast to the democratising
claims made of rankings, this police power short-circuits the
moment of democratic politics and establishes the basis for the
oligarchic power of the State and its status quo. Central in this
founding political moment is the notion of the Arkhè, a necessarily
asymmetric “distribution of the sensible” that establishes the basis
of the political order, in this case an oligarchic political order.
Drawing on Foucault and Rancière, the article argues for a
necessary “dissensus” with both the ranking practice and its
attendant academic literature, as the first step towards a politics of








The regulation of professions is hence another object of police.1
Introduction
This article is about making an argument. It seeks to bring a certain critical insight into the
essential and necessary character of academic rankings, and by implication the phenom-
enon of ranking generally. Most importantly, it attempts to put into writing that which
many suspect, fewer think, and about which hardly anyone seems inclined to write. It is
not a scientific investigation into the methodology of rankings, neither is it yet another
ameliorative analysis of the techniques of ranking, and it is not a literature review. There-
fore, those who are looking for a critical review of the rankings literature should look else-
where.2 No, it is in order to make a critical argument that this article exists, to be taken or
left at will, but a necessary argument nevertheless.
There have been numerous calls in recent years for a more theoretically committed and
penetratingly critical political analysis of how academic rankings function.3 However,
aside from consideration of the “performativity” or “effects” of rankings, the self-professed
critical or political literature never seems to engage with the very logic immanent to the
ranking apparatus itself, nor with how that logic itself entails a certain kind of “politics”
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that requires a certain kind of critique. The overwhelmingly normative and procedural lit-
erature never really breaks out of the positivist scientific mode, and it discusses the social
effects of rankings almost entirely within the empiricist idiom. So, if we therefore want to
get past the resignation and naïve managerialism that so marks the social science literature
on academic rankings, and so to grasp the ranking phenomenon in properly critical, pol-
itical, and even historical terms, it will be necessary to set out how rankings function, but
in terms more precise and penetrative than the mainstream social science discourse.
I shall offer a more intellectually energetic response: to challenge both the ranking
phenomenon itself and the social science literature on rankings, as merely two aspects
of the same aesthetic apparatus. I will depart decisively from the overwhelmingly prevalent
understanding of what research on rankings is about – contributing to policy formation –
and will instead reach for a more genuinely critical and political objective: to address aca-
demics directly so as to inform and encourage their potential resistances, struggles, and
counter-conducts to the political power inherent to ranking. Obviously not intended for
consumption by practitioners of the rankings art (or science), the purpose of this article
is rather, in one clear motion, to suggest the pallid state of the art to a broad social
science audience, those people whose lives are profoundly affected by this literature but
for whom the opacities of the rankings discourse is an immediate turn-off, and to
suggest how approaching the ranking phenomena in a different and properly critical
way can inspire a truly political response from interested parties both within and
without the bounds of the relevant academic scholarship.
Let me just clarify at this point what academic rankings actually are. They are those
ordinal and multi-dimensional series of unit-objects (universities, departments, individ-
uals, publications, etc.) compiled from the quantification of qualities that have conven-
tionally and broadly been considered “academic”, and placed and presented in ordered
relation to one another according to a given set of criteria. This means that the rankings
phenomena discussed below include not just the coordinating league tables, but also the
whole production of indices, indicators, data, assessment bodies, etc., for which serial
rankings are the goal, reason, purpose, and ultimate horizon for the coming into being
of these myriad techniques and tactics. The ranking apparatus is then the extensive and
intensive teleological realisation of a whole technology comprised of a great variety of
techniques culminating in the rankings presentation and integrated into the rankings
logic.
The chief critical claim I want to make here about academic rankings is twofold: (1) that
they do not promote democratic social relations, as is claimed of them by many,4 but are
reproductive of oligarchy; and (2) that any political analysis of them must depart from the
view of them as “reality-reflecting” epistemic media, and instead treat them as techniques
for deriving “fundamentally interested knowledge” to satisfy an imperative interest in gov-
erning. Whilst this double political and epistemic insight might seem obvious to many
critical theorists and philosophers, the prevalent view of rankings in the social sciences
is that they afford liquidating and disrupting policy tools of accountability, transparency,
and democratisation through markets, commodification, and objective techniques of
scientific measurement.5 This view of rankings, even when held by the socially sensitive
and “critical”, labours under the impression that undemocratic and oligarchic tendencies
in the extant rankings flow unfortunately from incorrect rankings methodology and an
improper choice of ranking form, and so are a consequence and outcome of the current
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rankings methodologies. I argue the more radical and unsettling point that the oligarchic
and anti-democratic effects of rankings are immanent to their very logic, and so are essen-
tial to them, rather than a consequence of them. The implications of this are again twofold:
(1) that rankings, whilst emerging historically as a response to a number of contemporary
social transformations (“massification”, global demographic mobility, telecoms revolution,
financialisation, etc.), are not techniques of radical and democratic transformation but are
“strategies of containment”,6 with an exhaustive and “schematic table of abstract possibi-
lities” that possess a “measure of truth on their own terms”, but which preclude radically
dissenting movements; and (2) that they are fundamentally incorrigible and beyond sat-
isfactory amelioration. Rankings are then not progressive, transparency-enhancing
policy tools, but apparatuses re-constitutive of the status quo. This means that they are
not in fact political, but apparatuses of police.
The decisive intervention I then want to make is to draw our attention away from ame-
lioration of the “police science”, whose aim is only ever to improve the workings of the
ranking apparatus, and by which its “concepts, the definitions, and the methodologies”
are rendered ever-more “refined and validated”.7 Instead, I shall question the ranking
form itself as a disposition of bodies in a given community that is constitutive of a
“police power” realised through a certain logic of aesthetic “distribution of the sensible”.8
This means that I am picking up Amsler and Bolsmann’s suggestion that “the better
alternative is to radicalize the debate by problematizing the practice of ranking itself
within the mainstream, asking the very questions that are explicitly silenced and creating
political situations in which they might be posed”.9 They explicitly recognise the establish-
ment of a “regime of institutional control” by rankings, which are then at best understood
not as neutral methods for understanding the quality or value of education, but as politico-
ideological technologies of valuation and hierarchisation that operate according to a principle
logic of inclusion and exclusion.10
This is the key insight upon which I want to elaborate into a critical agenda, though
beyond the institutional paradigm, by setting out how a critical analysis of the aesthetics
of police departs from the distinctly apolitical literature with which we are confronted.
At the risk of alienating myself from many potential readers in the relevant social
science discourses, this means that I do not want to work according to the parameters
within which rankings are reproduced, nor adhere to the logic of their operations, but
to strike at them, to begin that process whereby we come to understand their raison
d’être, not in order to mitigate their worst effects or to redirect their potentials, but to
destroy them through transcendence and counter-conduct. It is to be motivated by dissen-
sus, in contrast to the very telling willed gravitation toward consensus prevailing in the
rankings literature.11 This is because
Consensus consists, then, in the reduction of politics to the police. Consensus is the “end of
politics”: in other words, not the accomplishment of the ends of politics but simply a return
to the normal state of things – the non-existence of politics.12
In this direction, my basic assertion is that academic rankings afford an “apparatus of
security” and a particular knowledge-complex of the “police power”, as elaborated in
the works of Michel Foucault and Jacques Rancière. In their relevant works, particularly
in those of the latter, police is contrasted and opposed to politics, in both the rationality
248 J. WELSH
of modernity and the logic of social organisation proper to the aesthetic of capitalist
society in particular.13 Having said this, though they are doubtless possessed of hetero-
geneous logics, “politics” and “police” are intimately bound and imbricated with one
another,14 and so disentangling them conceptually is an essential requirement. Analyti-
cally separating the two, and relating that separation to both the practice of rankings
and the scholarship supposedly critical of them, will be the task of what follows below.
There are examples of rankings research that come close to this critical agenda,15 and
which hint at the analysis that I am going to elaborate below.16 However, none of them
have made the argument that I do here, and thus what will follow, I claim, is a necessary
contribution to bringing together “critical analysis” and “creative dissonance” to bear on
contemporary social and cultural life.
A problem of government: will-to-govern
In order to apprehend the political power in the ranking phenomena, we must grapple
with an established and overwhelmingly endorsed claim behind the spread and acceptance
of academic rankings. That is, that they represent an empirical means of perceiving and
presenting some kind of truth content about an object. This of course is the vulgar posi-
tivist metaphysics behind the “metrological realism” that dominates the world of academic
ranking.17 In this way, ranking as reified presentation of information offers a means of
measuring an objectively given reality. It is this pervasive and naïve positivism that
must be critiqued if we are to get to ranking as “fundamentally interested knowledge”,18
and therefore achieve our aim of a political rather than scientific analysis of the thing.
Michel Foucault asserted that “rationality” as an object of study is “the central issue of
philosophy and critical thought”, and that it cannot be understood in a relation of exter-
iority from power.19 He repeated as a guiding principle throughout his works that “liber-
ation can come only from attacking”, not simply the phenomenal, but “political
rationalities” very roots’.20 In his lectures on Governmentality – a portmanteau of “govern-
mental rationality” – he identified governmentality as both a rationality and modality of
power. As a political rationality, governmentality is a “specific form of normative political
reason organising the political sphere”.21 As a modality within the rationality, it is an his-
torically unfolding assemblage of institutions, reflections, analyses, procedures, calcu-
lations, and tactics allowing the exercise of a specific and complex power that has the
population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and “appara-
tuses of security” (appareils) and a “series of knowledges” (savoirs) as its essential technical
instruments.22
Governmental rationality requires apparatuses upon which pastoral interventions can
be made,23 interventions that constitute governmental action. These apparatuses require
the constitution of a territory upon which they can operate as a political technology.24
Apparatuses can take various forms, but one decisive form that they take is that of a knowl-
edge-complex that furnishes both a “grid of intelligibility” and a “force producing the intel-
ligible”.25 What needs to be elucidated then is how rankings constitute a governmental
territory out of a specific knowledge form and a motivating political and social force.
This is the political aesthetic I will elaborate here.
The object of governmental power is primarily neither an individual subjectivity (Dis-
cipline), nor a jurisdiction over which to rule (Sovereignty), but a population that becomes
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an “object of statistical analysis and scientific knowledge with its own intrinsic regu-
larities”.26 The imperative to govern generates “regimes of truth” to “regulate the ways
in which political regimes justify themselves and eclipse alternative arrangements by
casting their representation of the order of things as true”.27 This means that “to
govern it, forms of knowledge specific to it are needed”, and therefore there is a “will to
knowledge” inherent in the imperative to govern and thus in the apparent inexorability
of the emergence of rankings as just such a knowledge form.
In social science literature, it is assumed that causal flow in the constitution of rankings
proceeds thus: Objective Qualities of Empirical Reality → Disinterested Discovery →
Quantification Techniques for Measurement → Ordering Apparatuses for Acquired Data
→ Governmental Decisions Based Upon Evidence. Reversing this, as will be necessary
for my argument, means that I have to demonstrate how the emergence of academic rank-
ings does not end with government, but begins with it. This is the first task.
The American novelist Fletcher Knebel famously quipped that “smoking is one of the
leading causes of statistics”, and how right he was. For is it not in order to govern the life of
the population, the welfare of the population, and to constitute the very means of govern-
ing people, that statistics are derived, nay, are even conceived as a necessary technique.
The statistic as a form of knowledge of the world does not proceed the particular proble-
matic of government, it is vice-versa, and the form, quality, and derivation of that knowl-
edge will be determined by the problematic and the imperative to govern, not the other
way around. Foucault summarised this problematic in an allusion to institutional child
psychology:
In any case, what we find about children’s psychology is necessarily relevant for the way we
want to govern them because we need to know things about children’s psychology because we
want to govern them. There is a constitutive relation between the “will to govern” and the
“will to know”, and those relations,… are very complicated, constitute a nexus of governing
techniques and knowledge procedures (emphasis in the original).28
A similar argument applies to the will-to-knowledge in sexuality,29 where the apparent
“effects” of sexuality (public morals, gynaecological science, family law, etc.) have actually
produced, generated and begotten sexuality by discursively shaping and forming the “con-
ditions of possibility” in which sexuality emerges (Entstehung) as a knowledge form,
amidst various genealogical interplays and conflicts, for the purposes of governing
(women, children, the infirm, etc.).
With academic rankings, it is precisely this unreflexive “will to knowledge” that dis-
tracts us from the operations of power that do not “result from” them as effects,30 but
inhere to them as an ideal social model constructed by positivist-empirical social scientists
in order to establish particular criteria for the evaluation of social conditions so as to
govern them according to a particular interest (arkhè).31 We are misled into thinking
them to be contrived ex nihilo in the disinterested pursuit of scientific discovery, and
that our analyses are driven solely by the neutral aspiration for “best practices”,32 implying
erroneously that rankings are thus fundamentally amenable to the free and polymorphous
perversity of our intellectual manipulations and ameliorations. Symptoms of this reversed
procedural imperative are betrayed unwittingly in apologetic statements of resigned jus-
tification, such as “if rankings did not exist, someone would have to invent them”.33
They are not the result of a free and scientific choice, a “best” knowledge form upon
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which we have felicitously elected after long logical deduction, prolonged cogitation, and
lengthily reasoned supposition, but are the consequence of an imperative to govern imma-
nent to the historically emergent rationality of government and given particular form by
the struggle for reproduction in the collision of particular social forces.
The implication of this problem of government, and its consequential imperative will-
to-knowledge, is that the procedural epistemic flow in the constitution of rankings is actu-
ally inverse to the assumption in the social scientific literature, thus: Imperative for Gov-
ernment Decisions → Ordering Apparatuses for Data Production → Quantification
Techniques for Measurement → Interested Interpretation → Qualities of Empirical
Reality. This flow is the historical emergence of rankings, and as such it constitutes a foun-
dational moment in a new order characterised by a circular relationship between a given
knowledge-complex and a given constellation of social forces.
Quite simply, there is no constitution of knowledge that does not posit a prior interest,
to which it is an instrument. Crucially, this is not necessarily to deny the a priori objectivity
of the knowledge produced, and there is no necessary exclusivity or refutation of, what
some might call, the “truth-content”. The point is not so much to dismiss the “objectivity”
of knowledge in some kind of metaphysic, but to analyse and describe how objectivity is
unwittingly produced in rankings and what the implications of this “production of objec-
tivity” might be.34 It is rather a matter of which knowledge form, according to what logic,
and why now?
A problem of government: will-to-knowledge
We are going to break then with the prevailing view that rankings are reality-reflecting
phenomena according to which the objects that they purport to measure precede them.
Another task is to challenge the implicit assumption of negativity in the rankings epis-
temology. My epistemological view is fundamentally positive. By this I mean that there is
no such thing as the absence of knowledge. Ranking replaces one knowledge form with
another, privileges one over another, and emphatically does not establish a knowledge
form where there previously was none. What we have here, in the emergence of rank-
ings, is not so much a new transparency, a new window placed where previously there
was a wall, but a reformulated particular opacity, whereby one constellation of objec-
tified knowledges is substituted for another. Ontologically and mereonomically, one
set of relations between objects is replaced by another set. Certain discrete and coherent
objects are generated and defined either out of other objects or are rendered objective
from an undifferentiated plane of consistency that nevertheless has a positive existence.
The one is no more or less “transparent” than the other, but they do have different
effects, and it is with those effects that we ought chiefly to be interested if we wish to
derive a more political analysis.
The epistemological assumption of latent negativity implicit in extant ranking method-
ologies, and their apologetic literatures, segues into the discourse of “competition”, for
which an assumed ontological movement of greater liquidity, mobility, transparency, is
essential for its ideological legitimation under conditions of advanced capitalism. The
transparency discourse is an intimate consequence of an epistemological take on rankings
as unproblematically representational media. The transparency discourse is accepted
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unproblematically as a valid social epistemological argument for further penetration of
techniques of quantified calculation and measurement.
This analysis of rankings concerns then some kind of amalgam of homo sapiens and
homo faber. We must ask not simply what we know when we rank, nor simply what we
are doing, but both simultaneously: what we are knowing. Despite attempts in the new
multi-dimensional and “user-oriented” ranking methodologies and forms to move
beyond this, ranking seems stuck in the “age of representation”, where the representer
themselves cannot feature in the tables of ordered knowledge they construct. We must
engage in that most thoroughly modern of undertakings and break the paradox of the
Classical Age:35 to represent the representer.
The epistemology of representation lies at the heart of the knowledge-complex of rank-
ings, a knowledge-complex which reproduces those “Cartesian structures of adminis-
tration” that police the accumulation strategies of global capitalism,36 and beyond which
we must move if we wish to derive a more critical understanding of the political power
in ranking. This in turn requires “strategies of deconstruction” that are intended to
“break the exclusive and constraining link between reality and representation which has
dominated cartographic thinking and constitutes the implicit epistemology of its
history”,37 by “exposing specific forms of political rationality and the corresponding
forms of subjectivity as constraining, and at the same time as historically contingent”.38
Deconstruction of representational schemata moves us closer to a more thoroughly politi-
cal appreciation of the governmental power of rankings, as well as of their operative logic.
The decisive manoeuvre of the will-to-know is that of separating “knowledge” (the rep-
resented) from “knowing” (the activity of the representer). It is a sine qua non of the
quantification of knowledge so necessary formeasurement and ranking that it be conceived
and assumed to be an object. Such a reification does not admit of knowledge as an activity, a
knowing, as in the approach to knowledge offered in critical realism,39 for example, but a
reified thing to bemanipulated. A profound, but quite straightforward question therefore is
what interest might we have in such a persistent assumption of what is meant by knowl-
edge. Put in active, rather than possessive, terms, what interest do we have in knowing
thus? The answer that any self-respecting poststructuralist theorist would offer is initially
quite simple: power or governing. But is there not a circularity in stating that “far from pre-
venting knowledge, power produces it”,40 and then to say that a regime of knowledge, or a
particular manner of knowing, establishes the terms in which power is actualised as
“actions upon other actions”?41 Such a criticism might be valid, but the analysis here is
not an analysis of causal explanation. So circularity, far from threatening the argument
as a devastatingly counter-critical or rebutting observation, is in fact the very point I am
trying to argue regarding the epistemological basis, purpose, and operation of the
ranking phenomenon. This circularity is the containing power of its doxa.
This opens up one further problem. The “will to know” and the imperative to govern do
not prescribe the particular form a knowledge-complex will take. This has emerged as a
form of containment, a “strategy of containment”,42 for the social forces of transformation
in response to which rankings have arisen (Neoliberalisation, rise of the BRIC, financiali-
sation, “massification”, capital accumulation crises, telecoms and digital revolution, etc.).
The “will to govern” and the “will to knowledge” come together in the arkhè, at the same
instant as the representer is alienated from the represented. This is the founding moment
of police in the order of a given community – the “problematic of government” given
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particular expression – that is itself contingent but establishes the subsequent terms of
necessity for what follows after it and is predicated upon it. The arkhè is
a theoretical principle entailing a clear distribution of positions and capacities, grounding the
distribution of power between rulers and ruled; it is a temporal beginning entailing that the
fact of ruling is anticipated in the disposition to rule and, conversely, that the evidence of this
disposition is given by the fact of its empirical operation.43
The arkhè in rankings is that of oligarchic government, it is the prime mover in the
imperative to govern and the will-to-knowledge in the creation of academic rankings.
The historicity of rankings’ emergence is an important question to which I shall return
elsewhere, but this is the mechanism of its historical emergence. Here, I must now estab-
lish how police, and its arkhè, actually functions and operates within the governmental
rationality and its will-to-know. For this, I will have to turn further to Jacques Rancière,
and clarify an implicit question behind this analysis: what is Police?
Rankings and the aesthetic workings of police
Police is the “system of distribution and legitimization”,44 and is thus “first an order of
bodies”.45 But more than this, it is a “preservation of the relation of forces”,46 even and
especially amidst profound social transformation and political-economic reconfiguration.
It is the “set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is
achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the
system for legitimizing this distribution”.47 Rankings are a “distribution of the sensible”
(partage du sensible). This entails a
system of self-evident facts of sense perception [that] simultaneously discloses the existence
of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions
within it. This apportionment of parts and positions is based on a distribution of spaces,
times, and forms of activity that determines the very manner in which something in
common lends itself to participation and in what way various individuals have a part in
this distribution.48
Considering rankings as a police apparatus for reproducing a particular “distribution of
the sensible” then becomes a question of what counts as legitimate in the determination
of the criteria of this participation, against which assessments of academic phenomena
are then made for the reproduction of a particular governmental power.
Rankings provide us with an apparatus of the police power by their effective capacity to
render an account of academic activity, and in the asymmetry of that account to privilege
“speech” (logos) over “voice” (phônê) in their distribution of the sensible. What does this
mean? “Speech” is that form of utterance that is possessed of logos, that is to say, it is
logical, capable of being placed into a recognisable and accepted schema of meaning.
“Voice” is that form of utterance that does not fit into the logos of speech, that is predi-
cated on unrecognised or immeasurable premises and assumptions, and is therefore dis-
counted, considered illegitimate, mere “noise” (phônê). What Rancière means by
“account”, in his analysis of the distribution of the sensible, is the “deployment of a
specific scene of revelation”.49 In other words, a “staging” of the very terms by which
what constitutes speech over voice is established. The formulation, advocacy, and then
enforcement of academic ranking is precisely this kind of “staging”. Rankings only
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recognise certain contributions to a discourse regarding academia as “speech”, those utter-
ances and contributions capable of assimilation into rankings (quantification, indexing,
numeration, objectification, etc.), the rest is dismissed as “noise” (unrealistic, dreaming,
unscientific, not rigorous, biased, “politicized”, gamed, etc.). This
sustains a fundamental inequality between those who know and those who do not, and that
the possibility of designating what counts as knowledge further rests on specific perceptual
criteria that draw a division (i.e. a partage) between sensible and insensible objects of theor-
etical attention.50
Noise-makers are then denied a staging, and their “unscientific” contributions remain
unheeded and inconsequential. In this determination there is a “double wrong”. Not
only has their speech been coded as “noise” – ie. incapable of being given “logical”
expression, and thus not legitimate “speech” – but even that “noise” is not listened to
on its own terms as a noise, as what is considered noise never makes it into reports,
articles, books, conference proceedings, etc., let alone into the notebooks of social scien-
tists. Consider the relative “impact factors” of those journals at odds with the police
science, and those loyal to its modes and suasions. Do not “scientific” journals do best,
whilst arts or humanistic journals fair less well? Do not the econometrics journals suppor-
tive of the status quo receive higher ranking scores, whilst disruptive and discursive het-
erodox journals of political economy receive lower?
This asymmetry in how a distribution of the sensible is accounted is neither an acci-
dental, random, nor purely contingent phenomenon. It is a concomitant of the impera-
tive to govern and an arkhè of the State, every form of which can only ever be
“oligarchic”.51 In this respect, this pastoral power is a “throwback to Plato”, his old
joke about the proud ass, and the guardians of the polis for whom democracy not
only leads to chaos but a state in which – shock horror – “all natural relations are over-
turned” in the democratic moment.52
The asymmetric dynamic that generates the aesthetic distribution of the sensible is
thus an element of the raison d’état (reason of/for the state), an oligarchic rather
than democratic state, and therefore a component of the police power that reproduces
both it and the particular constellation of forces internal to it. In furnishing a distri-
bution of the sensible, ranking establishes a “territory” upon which the raison d’état
of the governmental rationality of power can be realised, but this territory is of a par-
ticular kind of aisthesis,53 and this is how the “police science” (Polizeiwissenschaft) is
constitutive of the “police power”, a fundamentally asymmetric power that perpetually
precludes or short-circuits the democratic moment. Within the rationality of govern-
ment, the asymmetry of account in the police science must be realised in the population
by means at once of “an art of government and a method for the analysis of a popu-
lation living on a territory”.54 The population as the target for pastoral intervention
of governmental power is not amorphous or symmetrical. Essential to its creation
and functioning, a population requires the creation of discrete objects in a totality. In
the case of rankings it means the creation of individuals, in fact disciplined individuals.
In this, there is a distinct mereology in the relationship of governmental to disciplinary
power in the emergence of the ranking phenomenon.
As for discipline… discipline was never more important or more valorised than at the
moment when it became important to manage a population; the managing of a population
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not only concerns the collective mass of phenomena, the level of its aggregate effects, it also
implies the management of population in its depths and its details (my emphasis).55
We must focus on how, by creating individuals (as objects) simultaneous to the creation of
populations upon which governmental power can then make interventions, rankings
create, in their reifying quantifications, the necessarily disciplined “bodies” for pastoral
intervention in a population to be possible, and thus for both a knowledge-complex to
be reproduced and a “discursive field” of “governmental” intervention to be established.56
This means that, rather than being simply a rhetorical strategy of deception and legitima-
tion, the individualising tendencies and claims made of rankings (“individual choice”,
“transparency”, “access and opportunity”, etc.) are actually a necessary component in
the regulation of populations. Academic rankings are a simultaneous disciplinary creation
and organisation of individuated bodies in a spatial field of visibility. Right at the heart of
this move from, and coming together of, discipline to government, rankings emerge as an
apparatus to ensure the spatial distribution of individual bodies (their separation, their
alignment, their serialisation, and their surveillance) and the organisation, around those
individuals, of a whole field of visibility.57
In the “standardised test” we can observe an earlier disciplinary indication in nuce of
what rankings would achieve as an apparatus in the modality of governmental power.
We can see how the individual person, institution, etc., is constituted as “effect and
object of power, as effect and object of knowledge” within a population.58 We can see
“the fixing, at once ritual and ‘scientific’, of individual differences, as the pinning down
of each individual in his own particularity” where “each individual receives as his status
his own individuality, and in which he is linked by his status to the features, the measure-
ments, the gaps, the ‘marks’ that characterize him and make him a ‘case’”. However, in the
governmental rationality, this function of the disciplinary mode is extended, intensified,
and situated into the population. As such, the social instrumentality of its individuality
is established. When we think of rankings in the governmental modality of power, “for
which individual difference is relevant”, we must perceive how it is in the combination
of “hierarchical surveillance and normalizing judgment” that there is reproduced the “dis-
ciplinary functions of distribution and classification” and thus the necessary “continuous
genetic accumulation, optimum combination of aptitudes and, thereby, the fabrication of
cellular, organic, genetic and combinatory individuality”.
The metastasis of statistics and markets, as the two most salient features of academic
rankings, can now be understood in this light. Regarding the former, we can now see how
Knowledge is necessary – concrete, precise, and measured knowledge as to the state’s
strength. The art of governing, characteristic of reason of state, is intimately bound up
with the development of what was then called “statistics” or “arithmetic”, that is, the knowl-
edge of different states’ respective forces. Such knowledge was indispensable for correct
government.59
The multiplying allusions to markets in academia, penetrating and spreading via the
ranking apparatus, means the commodification of academic activities and relations, at
least to some extent. This commodification is nothing more than necessary objectification,
and is not undertaken, as is artlessly assumed throughout the literature, in order for com-
petition to take place according to Neoclassical economic dogma. It is rather so as simply
to establish discrete objects out of the amorphous plane of immanence that is the yet
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unquantified range of human activity and experience, so that the imperative to govern can
be satisfied in the manner explained above.
At this point we can summarise the effect of this new system of power by saying that the
object (university, discipline, faculty, programme, individual, etc., and the unfathomable
plane of intellectual activity) is reified, created and “marked” so as to be disciplined and
then disposed of as a “case” within the apparatus (dispositif) for the perpetuation and pas-
toral care of the whole (population) on terms determined by the epistemic instrumental
rationality (the positivist status quo) that inheres to the rationality of ranking in the
modern police ordering of things. This is where we see how Sauder and Espeland’s analysis
of disciplinary power in rankings is insufficient and merely the first step to understanding
rankings’ more strikingly governmental power.
In rankings, we once again see the working of a kind of instrumental rationality with its
potential to devastate the aesthetic universe and render the eccentric and novel into auto-
mata and homogeny. The biopolitical individual is a collective individual, and between
such individuals “there is not a real distinction” within the biopolitical population
where one individual unit can quite easily resemble another.60 Here “the final objective
is the population”, which alone is “pertinent” within the emergent system of knowl-
edge-power, with its economic technology and management. This means that all else is
“simply instrumental”. Suffice it to say at this point that the educational claims of
greater “transparency”, “individual choice”, accountability, and “access”, that are made
of the rankings by their compilers and apologists, do not necessarily exist nor operate
to the benefit of those same individuals who now constitute biopolitical instruments
within this new system of power and its functional “forms of knowledge”.
From a police of ranking to a politics of dissent
What is the upshot of all this? Why be bothered? In the final analysis, it comes down to
autonomy, self-government, and democratic entailment. The goal here has been to oppose
emphatically the notion widely expressed, both implicitly and explicitly, that the pen-
etration and proliferation of rankings in itself is a boon for democratic practices.61
To conclude the argument, we must return to a somewhat abstract way of thinking
about rankings as a police apparatus. In its quantification of qualities into a discrete
and coherent datum, ranking makes a “surface of depicted signs”.62 This kind of surface
is “not simply a geometric composition of lines”, and as such the “territory” generated
by ranking out of the relations between objects that it establishes is similarly much
more than a geometric composition of lines. As a necessarily crude distribution of the sen-
sible, rankings become a “flat surface” or “mute surface” of depicted signs, meaning that
they cease to enact or enable “living” speech guided by a speaker to their addressee. They
thus by their very nature lack depth, richness, no matter what attempts we might make to
elaborate their dimensions, and so are forever to frustrate our demands for subtlety,
nuance, or socio-cultural sensitivity. Police science will never be able to integrate what
is required beyond the raison d’état and the will-to-knowledge under the imperative to
govern. In short, rankings are incorrigible and forever incapable of sufficient amelioration.
We miss this tragically when we scurry hither and thither, frittering away our time and
effort in pursuit of the wrong question – the question of attaining “the better” – instead
of confronting the more germane questions of power and cui bono. If we realise that
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rankings are not inevitable, and are not corrigible, this leaves one option – rejection – and
rejection in an aesthetic distribution of the sensible means dissensus.
To take us from police to a politics of rankings means moving the discourse from a con-
sensus to a dissensus. The implications of this are that it is the very existence of the distri-
bution of the sensible itself – the rankings apparatus – that must be combatted and
countered. But of course, what is so striking, and telling, about the rankings literature,
especially amongst the Micro-Methodologists,63 is the apparent need for there to be con-
sensus over the form, method, purposes of academic rankings.64 Herein lies the essence of
the “police science”, and the point at which my prescriptions diverge sharply from those of
almost everybody else. But outside of the incestuous doxa of the rankings discourse, I have
allies.
Political rationality has grown and imposed itself all throughout the history of Western
societies. It first took its stand on the idea of pastoral power, then on that of reason of
state. Its inevitable effects are both individualization and totalization. Liberation can come
only from attacking not just one of these two effects but rationality’s very roots.65
In the case of rankings, this means to attack the rationality of police, and the individuating
totalisation that adheres to its necessary establishment of a knowledge-complex as a ter-
ritory. Failure to do this is failure to be critical and political, and instead to contribute
to administration, management, and police. As we have seen, the bulk of “political
science” research on rankings fails on these terms.
So, politics is understood in this critical idiom as dissensuswith the rationality or logic of
police, and “political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or
changes a place’s destination”.66 In contrast to police, then, politics is that “extremely deter-
mined activity antagonistic to policing” that “breaks with the tangible configuration
whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a presupposition that, by
definition, has no place in that configuration – that of the part of those who have no
part”,67 those who are excluded whilst included.
Politics emerges whenever the order of the police is disturbed by acts of dis-incorporation of
the part of those who have no part. Political action is thus defined on the basis of this aes-
thetic part-taking: it is a reconfiguration of the perceptual disposition of sights and sounds.68
To get this “dis-incorporation” of the part of those who have no part, the recipients of the
“double wrong”mentioned earlier, we must then recapitulate the problem of “speech” and
“voice”. Politics exists because the logos is never simply speech, because it is always indis-
solubly the account that is made of this speech: the account by which a sonorous emission
is understood as speech, capable of enunciating what is just, whereas some other emission
is merely perceived as a ise signalling pleasure or pain, consent or revolt”.69 Rankings, both
in their compilation and in the academic industry of criticism that has calcified around
them, enforce one such account of speech, and therefore a political dissent to rankings
means shifting critical attention away from the determination of criteria and onto the
very existence of criteria itself.
This means that politics entails, not so much an epistemological break, but a “break of
epistemology as the qualifying perceptual criterion for political participation; that is, Ran-
cière wants to wrest democratic political action from the demand that it correspond to a
form of authoritative knowledge that will legitimate it”.70 What is to be rejected then is the
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very acceptance of any establishment at all of such criteria. To right the “double wrong”
therefore means to struggle for a greater equality in the distribution of the sensible, on the
basis of the realisation that “the essence of equality is in fact not so much to unify as to
declassify, to undo the supposed naturalness of orders and replace it with the controversial
figures of division”.71 Equality then “signifies the rejection of classifications characteristic
of a given police order”,72 and so the constellation of assigned roles is to be “subverted, not
just rearranged”.73 This is the outrageous hypothesis of the poetic “equality of indiffer-
ence”, resolutely arriving at the ruthless conclusion that “equality of all subject matter is
the negation of any relationship of necessity between a determined form and a determined
content”,74
Thus the inequality of a partage du sensible that establishes a hierarchy between those who
know and those who do not know, between those whose speech makes good sounds and
those whose utterances are mere noise, holds the potential of its own dissolution (emphasis
in the original).75
The implication of this is the most shocking conclusion of all: In order properly to end the
asymmetric inclusion-exclusion of those “whose part is to have no part” means either
rebellious absolute exit or the arrogation of power to the unqualified.76 By attempting
this re-staging of the “off-stage party” in today’s academia,77 those who had and have
“no part in anything” can now claim to have been wronged by their inclusion through
coercive apparatus and exclusion from any endowment of logos on this account, and
on the basis of which they have been held outside of participation in deciding on the
fate of the university by virtue of their being noise-makers, rather than speakers.
What do “dissensus” and “disincorporation” mean in terms of action and struggle and
the restoration of the democratic moment? The term equality in this idiom has no content,
but simply sets out the refusal of a particular content posited by the logic of police order,78
in this case rankings. In his discussion of assessment and evaluation in the university, Bill
Readings dismisses the strategy of “grand refusal” by academics as most likely to hand
strategic decision-making more completely over to ready and willing administrative
strata.79 Instead, he suggests opposition just to quantification, calculation, and statistifica-
tion as the only credible means of evaluation, and to refuse merely to “equate accountabil-
ity with [financial] accounting”.80 All well and good, but we are back once more and
nevertheless in the resigned acceptance of rankings’ inevitability, the imperative to
govern, the will-to-knowledge, and the thirst for rendering account of some sort. In a
sense, my argument asks too much of academics, requiring of them to abandon not
only their privileged positions and priestly aspirations, but also the very core of their
modality: logos. One might as well seek to persuade a king of the virtues of republicanism
or a factory owner of the definitional and necessary entailment of exploitation in their
profits. But one must try, and the refusal is the best I can offer at this time. It is a beginning,
and a counter-conduct more propitious for opening conditions of possibility than most
others, especially if worked through the dialectical movements inherent to rankings as
an apparatus of accumulation and reproduction in the capitalist world-system. This
latter story I shall be taking up very soon, but not today.
This leaves us with academic rankings that function to an instrumental rationality
potentially devastating to open and aleatory possibilities in our aesthetic universes, and
which threaten to render the eccentric and novel into automata and homogeny. The
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biopolitical individual is a collective individual, and between such individuals “there is not
a real distinction” within the biopolitical population where one individual unit can quite
easily resemble another. Within this emergent knowledge-complex “the population is per-
tinent as the objective, and individuals, the series of individuals, are no longer pertinent as
the objective, but simply as the instrument, relay, or condition for obtaining something at
the level of the population”.81 If the individual is “simply instrumental” then any claim
that rankings benefit the democratic individual due to the greater “transparency”, “indi-
vidual choice”, accountability, and “access”, that supposedly results from them, is highly
problematic, if not spurious. This is the grim and tangible aesthetic implication of the
police power in academic rankings, and in regard to which the derivation of a properly
political understanding of rankings becomes both urgent and necessary.
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